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AI AND IP: ARE CREATIVITY AND INVENTORSHIP
INHERENTLY HUMAN ACTIVITIES?
Christian E. Mammen* and Carrie Richey**
ABSTRACT
As artificial intelligence algorithms (AIs) become ever more powerful
and sophisticated, they are becoming capable of generating audio and visual
begs the question, can these AI-created works be granted copyright
protection in the U.S.? Should they be granted the same copyright protections
as human-created works? If AI-generated works are copyrightable, what are
the legal and policy implications? Similarly, AIs can now devise novel and
non-obvious solutions to known problems. The first patent applications have
been filed in the U.K. and elsewhere, naming an AI as an inventor. Can AIs
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has recently raised for public comment
about AI inventions in the U.S. Are we on the cusp of a new era that extends
intellectual property protection to computerat these protections
are exclusively available to the products of human creation?
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I. INTRODUCTION
Acts of creation and creativity are generally considered to be among the
core of activities that define what it means to be human. Creating art,
composing music, and writing literature fall into that category. So, too, does
the act of invention the spark of genius, the proverbial light bulb coming
As artificially intelligent algorithms become ever more powerful and
sophisticated, they are increasingly able to mimic these activities to create
audio data that (human) listeners might recognize as music, to create visual
data that some might call art, and to prepare written texts that are, at least,
coherent. They are also able to solve problems with solutions that nobody
else has ever thought of. But are these algorithmically-generated outputs
properly considered music, art, literature, and inventions?
Thus framed, this is a debate for the philosophers, the computer
scientists, and perhaps the mercantile interests backing both. We will not be
able to resolve that debate in this short essay. But there are closely related
legal questions that we can address. And while we cannot predict what the
law will be, or perhaps what it should be, we can shed light on what the law
currently is and how it approaches these questions.
II. ARE AI-CREATED WORKS PROTECTABLE UNDER
COPYRIGHT?
As companies are investing more and more into artificial intelligence,
and AI-technologies become more sophisticated, the outputs of those AI
technologies are looking (and sounding) ever more human-like. Particularly
more frequently raised over whether works created using AI-technologies are
protected under current intellectual property laws. If the current IP laws do
not provide protection, should they? Would extending protection be more
beneficial for innovation and creativity as a whole or would it backfire
against the very human artists copyright laws were originally meant to
protect? Interpreting or reinterpreting existing copyright law to keep pace
with the evolution of works becoming more computer-generated is at the
center of this debate.
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III. AI AND COPYRIGHT
U.S. Copyright law protec original works of authorship fixed in any
1
Copyright law does not, however, protect ideas,
procedures, principles, or processes.2
3

There seems to be a widespread
assumption that authorship has always meant human authorship,4 although
human.5 We have not identified any authority in U.S. case law or from the
Copyright Office that questions this assumption (though there has been
plenty of speculation to this effect in the academic and popular literature).6
But now that we are in the digital age of computers being capable of
generating complex audio or visual works, like a portrait that mimics the style
of a famous painter, or music that sounds like your favorite pop artist, it is
time to look critically at whether copyright law should require human
creativity.
IV. THE HUMAN AUTHORSHIP REQUIREMENT
U.S. courts and the Copyright Office have recognized the human
authorship requirement for over 200 years. This concept has come up in many
contexts, but no court or agency has yet taken the initiative to question its
val
entails something quintessentially, uniquely, human.

1

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019) (emphasis added).
Id. ( In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. ).
3 Feist Publ ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
2

4 Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Works Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
395, 399 (2016).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019).
6 Shortly after the United States Trademark Office ( USPTO ) published in the Federal Register
(84 FR 44889) a request for comments on questions concerning patent law as applied to AI inventions,
discussed infra, the USPTO supplemented that request seeking comments focused on how AI impacts
other types of intellectual property, including copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. As applied to
copyright law, the questions posed seek comments on whether AI-created works should be given copyright
protection, how involved must a human be to qualify the work for copyright protection, whether use of
training data is fair use, and whether AI protection promotes the goals of copyright law. The USPTO
explicitly states that the questions should not be taken as an indication that the USPTO has taken a
position, or is predisposed to any particular views. 84 FR 58141.
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This idea of human authorship first appeared in American case law at
least as early as 1879, when the Supreme Court pronounced that writings are
7

Five years later, when deciding whether copyright law protects
photographs, the Supreme Court distinguished between works of mechanical
reproduction and works of human ingenuity. Assuming authorship requires
tual
8

he to
The defendant argued a photograph does

mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object,
animate or inanimate, and involves no originality of thought or any novelty
in the intellectual operation connected with its visible reproduction in shape
9

ordinary production of a photograph, and, that in such case a copyright is no
10
But the Court did not need to decide that broader question
11

In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted a set of findings to the effect that the photograph reflected
original mental conception, to which he gave visible
he light and
12

In 1965, the Copyright Office received an application for a musical
composition created by a Datatron digital computer and rejected it.13 In its
technology develops and becomes more sophisticated, difficult questions of

7

In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 59 (1884) (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 59.
10 Id.
8

11

Id. at 60.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
13 Bridy, supra note 4, at 395 ( The rejection, for which the Office didn t offer and couldn t
have offered any statutory basis, revealed a deep-seated if unspoken assumption that authors are
necessarily human. ).
12
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But the Copyright Office was not concerned with

with its ability to determine whether, despite the use of machines in the
process of creating it, the work was of human authorship.15
In a 1973 compendium, the Copyright Office expressly adopted the
human authorship requirement, stating that copyrightable works must
16
.
To help delineate
the requirement, the compendium provided examples of non-copyrightable
works. One example is an applicant who pressurizes liquid petroleum
between two bonded plastic sheets to form outlines and contours of patterns
cannot claim a copyright in the work because such patterns and shapes do not
owe their origin to a human agent. Instead this is merely a novel idea
embodied in the work that does not warrant registration. Put another way, it
is a novel technique, but it produces random and unpredictable visual patterns
not attributable to a human.
This is distinguishable (or is it) from, say, Jackson Pollock, who is
known for splattering paint on a horizontal canvas. While it may look as

17

Others say his paintings were spontaneous like a lightning
bolt, taking only an hour to create.18 He controlled the color, direction, and
location of the paint (i.e., human origin) as opposed to nature creating the
randomness of the visual appeal of the work. Perhaps the question becomes
closer when an artist pours paint on a canvas on a spinning wheel, allowing
the forces of gravity to produce the visual effect, like Damien
paintings.19

14 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1965, at 5 (1966),
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1965.pdf.
15 Id. ( The crucial question appears to be whether the work is basically one of human
authorship, with the computer merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements
of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement,
etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine. ).
16 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 2.8.3 (1st
ed. 1973).
17 See 15 Most Famous Jackson Pollock Paintings, ARTIST EDITORIAL (July 6, 2009),
https://www.theartist.me/art/15-famous-jackson-pollock-paintings/.
18 Kelley Marks, Jackson Pollock Dripped His Way to Modern Art Stardom, HUBPAGES (Sept. 1,
2017), https://hubpages.com/art/Jackson-Pollock-Dripped-His-Way-to-Modern-Art-Stardom.
19 Damien
Hirst,
Spin
Paintings,
DAMIEN
HIRST
(2012),
http://www.damienhirst.com/texts1/series/spins.
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Since then, the Copyright Office has continued its practice of requiring
human authorship. The Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices says in
Section 202.02(b):
work to be copyrightable, it must owe its origin to a human
being. Materials produced solely by nature, by plants, or by
animals are not copyrightable.
Further, the Compendium II goes on to say in Section 503.03(a):
In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a work must
be the product of human authorship. Works produced by
mechanical processes or random selection without any
contribution by a human author are not registrable. Thus, a
linoleum floor covering featuring a multicolored pebble
design which was produced by a mechanical process in
unrepeatable, random patterns, is not registrable. Similarly,
a work owing its form to the forces of nature and lacking
human authorship is not registrable; thus, for example, a
piece of driftwood even if polished and mounted is not
registrable.20
Another example of a nonrandomly produces irregular shapes in the fabric without any discernible
21
Because a machine, not a human, was responsible for the resulting
lines on the fabric, the work cannot be copyrighted.
Recently, a judge in the Northern District of California interpreted the
copyright statute to require that an author had to be human when a copyright
22

points. First, the court found if Congress wanted animals to have standing to
bring a copyright claim it would have said so. Second, based on statutory
imply an author must be human.23 Following this opinion, the Copyright

20 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 503.03(a) (2d
ed. 1998), https://www.copyright.gov/history/comp/compendium-two-1988-chap1600-1900.pdf.
21 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed.
2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf.
22 Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016),
aff d, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
23 Id.
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authorship is a work that is independently created by a human author and
24

Based on case law and the current Copyright Office guidelines, it is safe
to say that the current interpretation of copyright law requires the author to
be human. Put another way, for a work to be copyrightable, it must owe its
originality to a human. Any work that does not would go into the public
domain. But this begs the question of whether works created using AI are
copyrightable. After all, humans are, to some degree, involved in the
development of the expression. Does it turn on the role of the AI?
V. APPLICATION UNDER CURRENT LAW

conclude that AI-generated images are copyrightable because the
the human is a low threshold. A
work satisfies the originality requirement as long as it possesses some
originality does not signify novelty.25 When evaluating whether a fixed
expression created using AI-technology is copyrightable, one could examine
whether the originality may be attributed to a human on a case-by-case
basis.26
Consider the banking group ING and Microsoft, which collaborated
with art historians and technicians to creat
paintings.27 They examined as much data as possible from the paintings. This
analysis led to the conclusion that the painting should be a portrait of a male,
30 40 years old, with some facial hair, facing to the right, with dark clothing
and a collar. From there, the programmers extracted only features from
paintings related to that specific profile. To create the painting from data, the

24 U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
COPYRIGHT
BASICS
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf.
25 Feist Publ ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991).

1

(2019),

26 Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO MAG. (Oct. 2017),
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html ( Some case law seems to indicate
that this question could be solved on a case-by-case basis. In the English case of Nova Productions v
Mazooma Games [2007] EWCA Civ 219, the Court of Appeal had to decide on the authorship of a
computer game, and declared that a player s input is not artistic in nature and he has contributed no skill
or labour of an artistic kind. So considering user action case by case could be one possible solution to the
problem. ).
27 Rembrandt Goes Digital, ING (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ing.com/Newsroom/Allnews/Rembrandt-goes-digital-.htm; see also ING Presents: The Next Rembrandt, NEXT REMBRANDT,
https://www.nextrembrandt.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
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programmers used statistical analyses and algorithms to extract the features
that make a Rembrandt a Rembrandt. They took parts of the face and
compared them to enable them to create a Rembrandt eye, face, and ear. They
used an algorithm to align the features and estimate the distance between the
eyes, nose, and ears. To mimic brush strokes on the canvas, they used data to
calculate the height of the paint on the painting and a 3D printer, resulting in
the paint-like texture of the work.
It is no question that the decisions by the programmers and other humans
involved with this project led to a more refined Rembrandt-style painting. So
28
Perhaps
the human originality is attributable to Rembrandt himself, insofar as the
Next Rembrandt is based on the creative choices he made over 300 years ago.
If so, would the copyright have expired before the work was even created?29
Or is this merely a novel, but uncopyrightable, idea of using AI to create the
We may analogize the Next Rembrandt or any AI-created work with the
analysis of the photograph in Burrow
of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and
conception on the part of the au
scene that conferred the creativity sufficient for authorship.30 But in the case
of AI-created works, those creative choices and the actions that result in the
creation of a work product are not necessarily reposed in the same
individual it is not Damien Hirst spinning the paint wheel or the
photographer operating the camera. In the case of the Next Rembrandt, was
conferred the creativity for the portrait? Did the programmers use data like
Rembrandt used brushes to create something new? Did they have any
conception of what the resultant work would look like? Do they need to? Is
31
Or is the training data just facts about

28 See Dani Deahl, We ve Been Warned About AI and Music for over 50 Years, but No One s
Prepared, THE VERGE (Apr. 17, 2019 10:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/17/18299563/aialgorithm-music-law-copyright-human (Warner Music registered six individuals as authors who used AI
. . even though
29 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2019) (copyrights in works created after January 1, 1978 endure for the life of
the author plus 70 years). Rembrandt died in 1669.
30 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 55, 59 60 (1884).
31 Licensed users who create the document and slides, or who select the data and train the AI, own
the fruits of their effort apart from the ones who provided the platform to execute their work; Amanda
Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L.
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a machine that merely p
expressive vision?32 Or did the AI displace the author all together?33
VI. TRAINING DATA AS FAIR USE?

rst, in contrast with the
Rembrandt example, what if the project was to create a work in the style of a
living and still-active artist? Could that alter the discussion about whether
-generated work based on that
establishes the factors to be considered in determining whether a use is fair
use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.34
One could readily construct an argument that a project like Next
Rembrandt, when trained using the entire oeuvre of a living artist (or even a
substantial part of it), to create a new work (or ten or a thousand) in the same
style could fail to satisfy these factors and be deemed not a fair use.
end of a spectrum. At the other end is
-how
from the user to the AI, and in the aggregate, those little bits of know-how
may add up to a fully competent decision model, but are there even any
REV. 579, 592 (2018) ( [T]raining data must be well-selected by humans training data infused with
implicit bias can result in skewed datasets that fuel both false positives and false negatives. ).
32 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
33 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and
Accountability in the 3A Era the Human-Like Authors Are Already Here A New Model, 2017 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 659, 675 (2017) (Human input is necessary for the work to have any sort of creative content. An
expert has become a tool for human creativity. ).
34 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2019).
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protectable rights in those individual bits of know-how? And if there are,
under doctrines other than copyright)?
VII. THE FUTURE
Because of the human authorship requirement, many believe that much
of the work generated using AI would not be copyrightable. Some legal
commentators view this as problematic and have proposed changes to
existing laws. Without establishing a period of protection, some argue that
developers of AI would have no tangible incentive to continue to create, use,
35
Some believe this trend could ultimately
limit innovation by dissuading developers and companies from investing in
AI research, leading to the decline of AI and innovation in this area.36 On the
other hand, if AI-generated works are protected, this could result in a virtually
unlimited supply of copyrightable work. This may drive down the market
value for AI-created works or have the potential to place further strain on
human artists in a field that is already difficult to earn a living in.37 There is
also the question of whether the availability of copyright protection truly
provides incentives for the generation of audio or visual works using AI. The
Berkeley Technology
entrepreneurship showed a divergence from the traditional theory that patents
38
The
same may be true for the copyright system. One may plausibly infer that ING
capitalize on the art-market value of the painting itself. And if AI creators are
viewed as artists in the traditional sense, history has shown artists are going
to create art, regardless of incentives. Vincent Van Gogh created over 2,000
works of art before he died poor at the age of 37.39

35 Daryl Lim, AI & IP Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L.
REV. 813 (2019).
36 Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA: J. FRANKLIN PIERCE
FOR INTELL. PROP. 431, 438, 441 42 (2017).
37 Alexis Clements, What Are the Chances? Success in the Arts in the 21st Century, L.A. REV.
BOOKS (Nov. 17, 2016), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/chances-success-arts-21st-century/; Eileen
Kinsella, A New Study Shows that Most Artists Make Very Little Money, with Women Faring the Worst,
ARTNETNEWS (Nov. 29, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/market/artists-make-less-10k-year-1162295.
38 See, e.g., Graham, Merges, Samuelson & Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1283 87
(2009).
39 Vincent
van
Gogh
Biography,
BIOGRAPHY
(Apr.
27,
2017),
https://www.biography.com/artist/vincent-van-gogh.
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If AI-created works should be given protection, how should current laws
be changed to extend protection? One proposal would permit AI to be named
as authors or co-authors, and the owner of the AI would own the work.40
being a human, this could be accomplished simply by interpreting the term
41
Another solution proposed is extrapolating the work
for hire doctrine of the Copyright Act.42 In its own publication, the Copyright
considered the author even if an employee actually created the work. The
43
employer can be a firm, an organization, or an in
This is flatly
Applying the work-for-hire doctrine to AI, the AI owner would be the
44
However, this, too, would
raise thorny
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
45
Thus, in order for AI-created work to be considered work for hire, it
would be necessary for the art-creating AI to additionally have the capacity
to enter into contracts (and the ability to sign written instruments). At first
blush, this seems even more of a stretch than the AI-authorship we have been
-based,
46
then perhaps the written contract requirement
could end up being deemed a mere formality.
While AI authorship may seem possible with only a few minor shifts in
existing law, the Copyright Office has not entertained the idea. For now, the
true economic realities of such shift have only begun to be explored.
VIII. ARE AI-CREATED WORKS PATENTABLE?
On a separate track from the ongoing debate about copyright protection
for AI-created works of art, there is also a debate about whether the patent
laws can provide IP protection for AI-developed inventions.

40

See Lim, supra note 35, at 836 37.

41

See id.
See Bridy, supra note 4, at 399.
43 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 1 (2012).
44 See Lim, supra note 35, at 843 45.
42

45

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2019).
See, e.g., Shermin Voshmgir,
https://blockchainhub.net/smart-contracts/.
46

Smart

Contracts,

BLOCKCHAINHUB

(July

2019),
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problems, whether designing new drugs47 or devising novel ways to win at
Mario Kart.48
would have thought of. Indeed these solutions may be commercially
successful, may resolve long-felt but unmet needs, other (mere humans) may
have failed, (human) experts may have doubted that the problem could be
that other (humans) have taught away from.49
atus reserved uniquely to humans?
These questions, which have been percolating for several years, have
now ripened to a full-blown active debate in patent law. News reports of the
first patent applications filed naming AIs as inventors were published in the
summer of 2019. Led by Professor Ryan Abbott at the University of Surrey,
a team of patent attorneys submitted two patent applications on behalf of an
50

type of beverage container based on fractal
geometry, while the other claims a device for attracting enhanced attention
themselves are described in more detail on the Artificial Inventor website.51
It has been reported that the UKIPO and the EPO have both determined that
the inventions are patentably novel, but that the question of AI inventorship
remains unresolved.52
container:

47 Gregory Barber,
, WIRED (Sept. 2,
2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/molecule-designed-ai-exhibits-druglike-qualities/.
48 YIZHENG LIAO, KUN YI & ZHE YANG, CS229 FINAL REPORT: REINFORCEMENT LEARNING TO
PLAY MARIO (2012); see also HARRISON HO, VARUN RAMESH & EDUARDO TORRES MONTANO,
NEURALKART: A REAL-TIME MARIO KART 64 AI (2017).
49 KSR Int l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (listing secondary considerations
concerning non-obviousness).
50 Laura Butler, World First Patent Applications Filed for Inventions Generated Solely by
Artificial Intelligence, UNIV. SURREY (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.surrey.ac.uk/news/world-first-patentapplications-filed-inventions-generated-solely-artificial-intelligence.
51 Patent Applications, ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR PROJECT, http://artificialinventor.com/patentapplications/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
52 Matthew Bultman, 1st Patent Apps for AI-Created Inventions Filed in US, Europe, LAW360
(Aug. 1, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184289/1st-patent-apps-for-ai-createdinventions-filed-in-us-europe.
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shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
53
The Patent Act employs
language suggestive that inventors must be humans. Section 101 provides,
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . 54
person
55
shall be entitled . . .
Scholars have published extensive and thoughtful analyses of the issues
arising from the introduction of AI agents to intellectual property law. One
56

53
54
55
56

Lim argues that the existing statutory

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2019) (emphasis added).
Id. § 102.
Lim, supra note 35.
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humans.57
. . who invented or discovered the subject matter of the
58

inve

59

However, the full text of section 8(a), when
read together with section 1 of the Dictionary Act, does not clearly limit
of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage o
In other words, these four terms include human infants, but the definition
include both humans and companies.60
in these three statutes invites an inference that the term is limited to natural
persons, but the statutes do not explicitly say so.
Thus, courts have sometimes been called upon, in various contexts, to
Construing the Torture Victim Protection Act, the
to denote a natural person, and in
particular to distinguish between a natural person and a
61
Earlier, several courts of appeals had
reached the same conclusion (citing the Dictionary
Act).62
Following the Mohamad case, the Ninth Circuit
Act to mean a single human being.63
64

In pre-Mohamad

57

Id.

58

35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2019).
Lim, supra note 35, at 858 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2019)).
60 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2019) ( [T]he words person and whoever include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals. ).
61 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012).
62 E.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126 27 (9th Cir. 2010); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 112 n.23 (2d Cir. 2010).
59

63
64

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep t of Agric., 933 F.3d 1088, 1093 94 (9th Cir. 2019).
In re N. (Gadd Fee Application), 12 F.3d 252, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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ed from corporations,
but has sometimes been interpreted to include
corporations.65
On the other hand, a criminal statute prohibiting damage
to protected computers causing damage to one or more
persons and corporations.66
Thus, it seems that, in the U.S. at least, the federal statutory meaning of
seems to be fairly soundly
established as limited to natural persons. But this is not nearly the end of the
debate. Weighty discussions of whether AIs should have some form of
years.67 Several years ago, the European Parliament drew significant
In a Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law
Rules on Robotics (2015/2103 (INL)), the Committee on Legal Affairs
proposed the creation of a new category of electronic personhood and
included a call for the Eur
68

(Notably, there was not also a parallel call to action relating to
patenting.). The proposal drew considerable media attention at the time,
69

More recently, discussions concerning

65 See In re Jove Eng g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996) (limited to natural
persons); see also In re Goodman, 991 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases, noting that Third
and Fourth Circuits had interpreted individual in Bankruptcy Code to include corporations, but rejecting
that interpretation).
66 United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000). But see United States v. Hilton,
701 F.3d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 2012) (construing statute protecting individuals as victims of identity theft
as limited to natural persons).
67 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1239 (1992) (considering a theoretical framework for the question, drawing a distinction between
personhood and humanity, and drawing no clear conclusions).
68 Draft Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 2016),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-PR-582443_EN.pdf?redirect.
69 E.g., James Vincent, Giving Robots Personhood Is Actually About Making Corporations
Accountable,
THE
VERGE
(Jan.
19,
2017,
10:45
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/19/14322334/robot-electronic-persons-eu-report-liability-civil-suits;
see also Alex Hern, Give Robots Personhood Status, EU Committee Argues, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/12/give-robots-personhood-status-eucommittee-argues. The Guardian quoted attorney Ashley Morgan of Osborne Clark on the implications of
the EU proposal,
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AI personhood have expanded to the estate planning context.70 However, in
a 2018 press release concerning its priorities, the European Commission
made no mention of either the personhood or IP aspects of the proposal.71
Indeed, even as we in the United States may find ourselves focusing the
be different in other countries that have different statutory requirements. As
the U.S. Manual for Patent Examining Procedure
The
requirement that the applicant for a patent be the inventor is a characteristic
72
And, as noted
above, a group of academics in the United Kingdom is pressing for the
issuance of patents with AIs as inventors and has provided arguments in favor
of such patenting under U.K. law.73
applications, what had been a largely academic debate in the United States
broke through into active policy discussions. On August 27, 2019, the
USPTO published in the Federal Register74 a request for comments on twelve
questions concerning patent law as applied to AI inventions. The request for
comments broadly defi
use AI and inventions that are developed by AI, and the questions
accordingly reflect the broad scope of these topics. Relevantly to the question
of inventorship, the questions include the following:
Do current patent laws and regulations regarding
inventorship need to be revised to take into account
inventions where an entity or entities other than a natural
person contributed to the conception of an invention?

If I create a robot, and that robot creates something that could be patented, should I own that patent
or should the robot? If I sell the robot, should the intellectual property it has developed go with it?
These are not easy questions to answer, and that goes right to the heart of this debate.
70 Alexandra M. Jones, Old Days Are Dead and Gone: Estate Planning Must Keep Its Head Above
Water with the Changing Tide of Technology, 11 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY. PROP. L.J. 161, 167 (2018).
71 European Commission Press Release IP/18/3362, Artificial Intelligence: Commission Outlines
a European Approach to Boost Investment and Set Ethical Guidelines (April 25, 2018),
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3362_en.htm. See also Thomas Burri, The EU is Right to
Refuse Legal Personality for Artificial Intelligence, EURACTIV (May 30, 2018),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/the-eu-is-right-to-refuse-legal-personality-forartificial-intelligence/.
72 USPTO MANUAL FOR PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2137.01 (2018).
73 See Robert Jehan, Should an AI System Be Credited As an Inventor, ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR
PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2019), http://artificialinventor.com/should-an-ai-system-be-credited-as-an-inventorrobert-jehan/.
74 Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions, 84 Fed. Reg. 44889
(2019).
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Are there any patent eligibility considerations unique to
AI inventions?
Does AI impact the level of a person of ordinary skill in
the art? If so, how? For example: Should assessment of
the level of ordinary skill in the art reflect the capability
possessed by the AI?
Are there any new forms of intellectual property
protections that are needed for AI inventions, such as
data protection?
Without a doubt, many commentators will weigh in on this now-hot
topic. In his Skilled in the Art column published the same day as the USPTO
notice,75 IP journalist Scott Graham collected some initial reactions to these
of Surrey who has filed AI-invented patent applications, as well as a number
of Silicon Valley patent practitioners. The practitioners expressed varying
degrees of skepticism about the notion of AI-as-inventor, articulating
variously that inventors must be human (even if heavily machine-assisted in
their inventions) and that the existing patent laws could not support nonhuman inventors without some major overhauls and perhaps without
-size-fitsIX. OBVIOUSNESS AND ENABLEMENT
In addition to the overriding question whether AIs can be inventors, the
introduction of AIs into the inventive process will have other knock-on
effects in the patent law, particularly where the patent law uses the level of
ordinary skill in the art as a benchmark. For example, a claimed invention is
date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
76
If an AI can be an inventor, is the
p
contribution is measured a human or another AI? Would the obviousness of
of human beverage-can designers or against other AIs? If the former, why is
it fair to measure the AI against a human-developed level of skill in the art
(and vice-versa)? If the latter, are there any limitations on the AIs level of
75 Scott
Graham,
Skilled
in
the
Art,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
27,
2019),
https://www.law.com/2019/08/27/skilled-in-the-art-the-pto-has-questions-about-ai-our-experts-offersome-answers/.
76 35 U.S.C.S. § 103 (2019).
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skill in the art? Is every AI sui generis, effectively meaning that there can be
no POSITA yardstick, or is every AI potentially chargeable with all the
knowledge on the Internet, potentially meaning that everything is obvious
(and therefore unpatentable) to an AI?
Similarly, the written description of a patent must enable a POSITA to
make and use the claimed invention.77 This, too, raises a host of issues.
should the enabling disclosure be expressed? Does it even need to be
understandable or readab
description requirement be satisfied in an AI-invented patent by a data dump
of machine code?
X. CONCLUSION
How this conversation plays out is going to be interesting. It raises some
of our long-held and deepest-seated anxieties and optimism about the peril
patent laws in the U.S. and elsewhere likely in ways that were not
considered when the initial language was drafted. On this latter point, we
How Law Made Silicon Valley78:
The legal moves described here in the United States have
helped facili
in our zeal for promoting the Internet enterprise, we do not
haphazardly create the conditions for a dystopia.

77
78

See id. § 112(a) (2019).
Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 693 (2014).

